Firms often cooperate explicitly in certain dimensions, such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from R&D expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in other markets, however, leading to losses in welfare and efficiency. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if sellers successfully coordinate to fund a joint research project to reduce their costs, and how this collaboration affects pricing and efficiency in their market. The motivating example context is research collaborations to reduce costs of abating greenhouse gas emissions, and the potential impact on an emissions permit market. The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets. Our results show that although subjects usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperative actions are less common when they also compete in the market. This suggests that market competition can spill over to hinder cooperation. Communication between individuals improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is present. Nevertheless, the data indicate little support for market collusion. This weak evidence for behavioural spillovers suggests that policy makers could promote R&D collaborations and still expect robust market competition.
Introduction
Both competition and cooperation are important for the successful operation of many economic systems. For example, firms compete in markets but they also cooperate with one another through arrangements such as research joint ventures, lobbying, cooperative marketing agreements and strategic alliances. Response to climate change is a prominent illustration of the need for both cooperation and competition. While cooperation amongst firms and countries is needed to solve this complex international collective action problem, competition between firms is also essential to provide incentives for innovation that leads to a reduction in the costs of controlling emissions. Given this complimentarity, there has been growing interest in both competition and cooperation, with economists and policy makers endeavouring to find market solutions to social dilemmas. Markets for emissions permits are one important example.
In this paper we use experiments to examine how the competitive forces that are the foundation of economic systems interact with individuals' preferences to cooperate. A large body of theoretical research has focused on firms cooperating in research joint ventures and this impacts competition in output markets. For example, Cooper and Ross (2007) examine the mechanism by which agreements to cooperate in one market can have negative effects on competition in other markets, even in situations when these markets are not linked via costs or demand. Cabral (2000) shows that product market prices are affected by R&D agreements between firms. Caloghirou et al. (2003) , Lambertini et al. (2003) , Theotoky, (2007) also discuss the impact of forming research joint ventures on product markets and cartel formation. The notion of spillovers we are concerned with involves cooperation in one domain (such as a research joint venture) and competition in another (such as the output market). These could 1 Many of the theoretical models developed in these papers build on the seminal research by d'Asperemont and Jacquemin (1989) and Kamien et al (1992) . be referred to as behavioural spillovers. This is distinct from knowledge spillovers that occur in R&D when the innovator cannot fully appropriate the gains to innovation, which can lead to a socially inefficient level of research (deBondt, 1996) . Several researchers have used theoretical models to examine the impact of R&D spillovers. For example, Cellini and Lambertini, (2009) show that irrespective of the levels of spillover, cooperative behaviour in R&D would be preferable from both a private and a social point of view. Their dynamic model allows for investment smoothing over time, hence the externality is internalised via the joint profit maximisation in the R&D phase and this is socially desirable irrespective of the spillover effects. Amir (2000) presents a comparison of the different models which consider R&D spillovers and illustrates the sensitivity of the results to minor changes in model specifications.
Empirical work using field data has provided creative indirect evidence on the collusive potential of research joint ventures by exploiting natural "policy experiments." Goeree and Helland (2008) , for example, show that research joint ventures facilitate collusion by showing that they became less popular once an enforcement policy change (leniency) was introduced that made collusion less attractive. Policy experiments such as these are often required since much systematic collusion goes undetected by authorities. Our work however, provides more direct evidence, since in the laboratory we can observe the level and sustainability of tacit and explicit collusion directly. Of course, since our experimental subjects are not interacting in a naturally occurring market in the field, this type of empirical evidence has other drawbacks.
The specific research goals of the present study are the following. First, we wish to determine if individuals recognise and take advantage of the gains from cooperation in the presence of payoff uncertainties, and how this may depend on opportunities to communicate with others. Second, we are interested in learning if a behavioural spillover of cooperation can lead to collusion in markets, or whether competition in markets reduces non-market cooperation. Third, we seek to determine how this interaction between cooperation, competition and collusion is affected by non-market communication opportunities. Finally, we will quantify the surplus spillovers from R&D cooperation to others in the market, which are distinct from behavioural spillovers. We use laboratory methods to explore the links between competition and cooperation.
None of the (few) previous experiments that have considered behavioural spillovers have included markets.
Our research is motivated by recent developments in policies to mitigate climate change.
While trading in carbon emission permit markets is being implemented or considered by different countries, governments are also actively promoting cooperative R&D arrangements between firms to reduce the future costs of emission reductions and the discovery of new technologies. Although our experiment is inspired by the R&D literature, it is not tightly tied to any particular existing theoretical model of R&D. Rather, it is designed to incorporate some of the complexities that arise in some relevant field applications.
Subjects in our experiment trade in a computerised double auction market where they make price offers and can accept offers made by others. Although the experiment employs neutral, non-environmental framing, this market is intended to represent an emissions trading system. Some of these subjects (the net permit sellers) have the option to contribute voluntarily to a public good, corresponding to a research joint venture, which may (probabilistically) reduce their emissions abatement costs. The predicted equilibrium permit prices are lower if the public good is provided, so permit buyers can also potentially benefit from a public good, R&D spillover. Contribution to the public good is modelled as a threshold (provision point) public goods game, in which the good (the reduction in abatement costs) is provided if contributions exceed the required threshold level of contributions and if the research project is (stochastically) a success. Many collective action scenarios can be represented as public good games. Firms contributing to a research fund can, for example, be thought of as a situation that requires collective action and needs cooperation of financing or efforts to reach a specific threshold. The final outcome of the research project also depends on a random component, which is captured in our experiment by stochastic research success.
We find that while there are some behavorial spillovers, mostly cooperation and competition can co-exist without impacting each other. In particular, cooperative behaviour is less frequently observed when subjects also compete in the market, however cooperation has no impact on the extent of market competition. Communication helps subjects coordinate on an efficient choice of public good contributions in all environments, and we also observe significant R&D surplus spillovers. The weak evidence for behavioural spillovers' affect on competitive markets suggests that policy makers could promote R&D collaborations and still obtain robust market competition.
Few previous studies have used experiments to examine issues in R&D and competition.
In an early paper Issac and Reynolds (1992) reports an experiment where sellers compete in prices and in cost reducing research and development. Sellers competed in a posted offer market (with simulated buyers) and after five periods, they participated in a costly innovation stage, which if successful lowered costs for that seller only. They find that sellers engage in substantial R&D, which drives down market prices. Davis, Quirmbach and Swenson (1995) varied the tax subsidy available to subjects who invest in R&D and also the appropriability of returns to R&D.
They find that an equal tax subsidy across investors increases levels of investment in R&D, but not in proportion to the amount of the subsidy. Buckley, Mestelman and Shehata (2003) examine the effectiveness of alternative subsidy schemes in stimulating R&D. They show that incremental subsidies (where the subsidy is equal to the difference between investment in the given period and the investment in the previous period) are less effective than level subsidies, where a subsidy is provided to all investment undertaken in a given period. Suetens (2005) tests how different levels of appropriability (spillover) of R&D affects investment. Suetens (2008) adds competition in the product market to the framework above and finds that binding R&D cooperation facilitates price collusion in a duopoly context. One key difference of our experiment is that our market employs more sellers in each market (triopolies) and a richer double auction market trading institution.
The idea that individuals' behaviour could spill over across different environments or domains is also beginning to receive some attention in the experimental literature. Bednar et al. (2009) document behavioural spillovers for several different types of two-player bimatrix games. Savikhin and Sheremeta (2009) study simultaneous play of two widely studied experimental games, and they find that cooperation in a voluntary contribution game reduces competitive overbidding in contests. Cason, Savikhin and Sheremeta (2009) show that a behavioural spillover in coordination occurs for two different coordination games, but only if they are played sequentially. They find no significant spillover occurs with simultaneous play.
Design
The experiment is designed to study the links between market competition and cooperation. It uses a 3×2 design, summarized in Table 1 , employing a total of 264 subjects. In one treatment subjects participated only in a threshold public goods game, in another they traded only in a market and in the third treatment subjects participated in a market, with some also interacting in a threshold public goods game. Each of these treatments included sessions in which certain subjects were allowed to communicate with each other using typed text in computer based chat rooms, contrasted with sessions in which subjects made decisions without any communication 
Treatments
The Combined treatment includes data from 20 sessions. In all sessions, 6 subjects traded in a computerised double auction market across 27 separate periods. Our market design was motivated by emissions trading markets in which all participants have the opportunity to buy and sell emission permits, although neutral framing was used to avoid environmental terms such as emissions and pollution. Subjects in our experiment were required to hold a "coupon" to be able to avoid producing a unit. This represents holding an emissions permit to avoid abating one unit of pollution. Abatement costs increase as subjects increase abatement and they can avoid these cost increases by reducing emissions and holding permits. Permits are allocated every period and subjects can adjust their permit holdings by buying and selling in the market. Subjects were advised to compare the price of the permit in the market with their individual costs and on that basis decide to be buyers or sellers.
As shown in Table 2 , three of the six subjects had relatively low abatement costs and high permit endowments so that they would be sellers in the market. The other three subjects had higher costs and low permit endowments and so were buyers. At the start of each period the buyers were endowed with 3 permits each and the sellers with 7 permits, creating a total supply of 30 permits. Each subject's abatement was automatically adjusted at the end of the trading period to increase (decrease) by one unit for every permit sold (bought). The equilibrium price in the market ranged from 500-525 with 4 units traded by each subject in equilibrium, as illustrated in Figure 1 . At this equilibrium, the 3 buyers were predicted to earn a total of approximately 1425 experimental dollars each period and the 3 sellers were predicted to earn approximately 1500. (The exact amount depends on the location of prices in the equilibrium price interval.)
Subjects participated in this market for 6 initial periods and then in blocks of 3 periods.
After the first six periods and after some of the 3 period blocks, the 3 sellers participated in a threshold public goods game. This public good is intended to represent a common project such as a research fund, and the sellers had to decide whether they wanted to contribute to this common project. If successful, this project would reduce their abatement costs for the next block of 3 periods.
For the common project to be successful, the total group contributions by the three sellers had to reach a threshold of 1500 or more experimental dollars. If group contributions reach or exceed this threshold, with a 75% probability the project is implemented. This random shock captures the uncertainty involved in the realisation of benefits from R&D projects.
Implementation of the project implies that marginal costs for each of unit of abatement are lowered by 100 experimental dollars. As shown in Figure 1 , this leads to a reduction in the equilibrium price to 450-475 with 5 units being traded by each subject in equilibrium. The predicted total profits of the buyers were approximately 2250 and the sellers approximately 3000. With these parameters the sellers' total return from the innovation is 3000-1500=1500 per period, or 4500 for each 3-period block. Thus, the step return (Croson and Marks, 2000) to this threshold public good, accounting for the 0.75 probability that the good is provided, is (0.75×4500)/1500=2.25. In equilibrium the 3 buyers gain by a total of approximately 2250-1425=825 per period, generating the R&D spillover for this context.
If the project is not implemented, sellers have a new opportunity to contribute to the project after every three-period block in which they have not already lowered their costs by implementing the project. After every three-period block in which they have had costs lowered by 100, the costs return to the original, higher level for three periods. At the end of that threeperiod block they have another new opportunity to contribute to the project to again lower their costs. The design thus features stationary repetition of the 3 block contribution and trading mechanism cycle to allow for learning.
In the 10 sessions where we allowed sellers to communicate, they could send computer based chat messages to each other for 90 seconds before they made decisions on contributions to the common project. Chat mediated communication is common in the experimental economics literature, since it allows for rich communication opportunities while still maintaining anonymity and permitting control and complete observability about what communication is being exchanged. While the sellers communicated with each other and made decisions concerning their contribution to the public good, the buyers were asked to type into their computer some information about their decisions in the market. 2 The buyers were not given any information about the public good or that seller contributions to it could lead to lowering of abatement costs.
In the communication sessions buyers did not even know that sellers were communicating with each other. Buyer abatement costs remained unchanged throughout the experiment. The experiment instructions for the Combined treatment are included in the Appendix.
In the Market Only treatment (16 sessions), subjects traded with each other for 27 periods and did not have an opportunity to lower their costs. Costs for both buyers and sellers remained unchanged across all 27 periods. In 8 sessions sellers were allowed to communicate with each other, again while buyers filled out questionnaires relating to their decisions in the experiment.
To ensure that the subjects in both treatments had opportunities to communicate after the same periods, all the Market sessions were conducted after the Combined sessions. In the Public Good Only treatment (16 sessions) subjects participated in groups of three for 8 periods. This treatment isolates the sellers' problem of R&D cooperation in a simple reduced form by immediately translating successful cost reduction to increased profits, without having to realize these profits in a market. Each subject could obtain 1500 experimental dollars every period and in certain periods they had an opportunity to increase this income to 3000 experimental dollars. The numbers were chosen to correspond to the profit amounts the seller subjects would earn in competitive equilibrium for the three period blocks in the Combined treatment. Just like the Combined treatment, to increase payoffs the subjects had to reach a total contribution threshold of 1500, and also have an innovation success random draw (again with 0.75 probability).
2 This was mainly so that all subjects were typing at the same time to obscure buyer and seller identities and reduce any possible suspicions by the buyers that the sellers were chatting with each other using their computers. 3 To ensure comparability with the no-communication sessions in the Combined treatment, even in sessions where sellers were not allowed to communicate, buyers answered questions.
Our experimental design has some novel features. Firstly, we have explicitly incorporated markets where participants compete to trade with each other. This is unlike the framework in Suetens (2005 Suetens ( , 2008 where the subjects participated in a two person duopoly game and made offers to simulated buyers. Secondly, unlike the papers by Issac and Reynolds (1992) and Buckley et al. (2003) , we have built upon the market structure to include a stage where some subjects have the opportunity to contribute towards a research fund. The "research" is also successful only stochastically, differentiating this threshold public goods setting from most of the experimental literature. Thirdly, our design allows us to isolate the impact of behavorial spillovers from R&D spillovers. The additional treatments with public goods and markets examined separately provide a valuable comparison.
Procedures
The experiment was conducted using Z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and all subjects were students at the University of Melbourne with different academic backgrounds, including economics. We conducted 52 independent sessions, and all 264 subjects were inexperienced in the sense that they had not participated in public goods games or double auction markets before. Some had participated in previous economics experiments. Although subjects interacted anonymously in 3 or 6 person fixed groups (depending on the treatment), multiple sessions were conducted simultaneously in the laboratory with 12 to 24 subjects. Upon arrival at the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned a computer terminal. Each terminal had large partitions which prevented visual contact between subjects. They were asked to read the experimental instructions and to answer a set of computerised questions that examined their understanding of the experiment. In the Market Only and the Combined treatments buyers and sellers had different instruction sheets in the communication condition since only the sellers communicated. Before the session began the experimenter read out loud a one page summary of the instructions to establish common knowledge about the main experimental rules and conditions. At the end of their session, subjects filled out a demographic survey with questions regarding their age, gender, field of study, and other characteristics. They were paid privately in cash, and earnings averaged AUD 35. 
Results
The results from the experiment are presented and organised around the research questions outlined in the introduction.
Cooperative "Research" Funding
We first explore whether individuals can recognise and exploit the benefits from cooperation. To determine if this depends on the environment and to study the impact of communication, we examine data in the Public Good Only and Combined treatments, with and without communication.
We define two alternative dependent variables that each capture different aspects of cooperative behaviour. The first variable is the number of times subjects met the contribution threshold of 1500 experimental dollars as a proportion of the number of times they had an opportunity to contribute. Figure 2 presents these proportions graphically for each of the 36 sessions in the Public Goods Only and Combined treatments. The second variable is the average total contributions made by the subjects in each session when they were given an opportunity to fund the good. We conduct non-parametric two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum tests to compare behaviour across the two treatments, using exactly one (statistically independent) aggregated measure from each session. Both of these measures are higher for the Public Good Only treatment than for the Combined treatment. For example, when subjects are not allowed to communicate, the proportion of times the threshold was met in Public Good Only is 0.66, compared to 0.38 in Combined. However as can be observed in Figure 2 , for many of these across treatment comparisons there is significant overlap in the distributions of contribution frequencies, so these conservative nonparametric tests do not indicate statistically significant differences. Table 3 summarises these results.
Allowing communication between subjects, however, has a large and statistically significant impact on whether the threshold is met in both the treatments. The top right column of Table 3 contributions take only 2 values (0 -observed in 6% of the cases; 500 -observed in 94% of the cases). 5 In contrast, in sessions where subjects cannot communicate their individual contributions vary from 0 to 800, and 500 is observed only 56% of the time. This increased coordination 5 In the Public Good Only treatment, the threshold was 1500 and with 3 subjects in each group, the obvious focal point equilibrium is symmetric and has each contribute 500. Other asymmetric equilibria exist but they are not focal.
through communication has been observed previously in coordination games (e.g., Blume and Ortmann. 2007; Cason, Sheremeta and Zhang, 2009 ). Table 4 reports results from a panel regression analysis which pools the data from the different treatments and studies behaviour over time. We estimate a random effects probit model for the proportion of times the threshold was met and a random effects tobit model for the total amount contributed by the subjects in each session. 6 These panel regressions employ a random effects error structure, with the session representing the random effect. The independent variables include a dummy to capture the impact of communication between subjects and in sessions in which subjects could communicate, a dummy for the Combined treatment and time (expressed in the commonly used nonlinear form 1/period). When subjects can communicate with each other, the threshold is met more often and contributions are significantly greater.
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Subjects in the Combined treatment meet the threshold less often, and contribute less on average.
These differences are only marginally significant, however. Reduced contribution incentives in the Combined treatment could arise because even though the costs of abatement fall when the good is provided, as documented below in Section 3.4 this does not always lead to higher earnings because profits depend on market outcomes. Hence the link between cooperative behavior and earnings is weaker due to the vagaries of the market. Behavorial spillovers could also exist, causing subjects to be less cooperative in environments where they also participate in a competitive market stage.
Market Competition-Prices
The results from the Public Good Only and Combined treatments indicate that communication is key for promoting cooperative behaviour. Given its importance in this cooperative domain, as also documented well in the survey in Ledyard (1995) , it is important to examine its impact in the competitive domain-specifically in the market stages of the Combined treatment and the Market Only treatment. To address this we examine price and efficiency measures in the Combined and Market Only treatments.
We examine the behaviour of prices in the Market Only and Combined treatments by studying how average price deviates from the competitive equilibrium predictions. The competitive equilibrium depends on whether sellers face high costs or low costs. As shown in 18.56 versus -13.59; p-value: 0.034) . This is consistent with the familiar finding that communication facilitates collusion (e.g., Isaac et al., 1984) . Figure 3 shows that in the later period blocks the differences across treatments disappear. Average prices converge to the upper endpoint of the competitive equilibrium price interval in all treatments.
To account for this time trend and other factors that can influence prices, Table 5 presents results of a random effects regression that employs the average price deviation from competitive equilibrium over each 3-period block as the dependent variable and is a function of time, whether firms communicated at the beginning of the block of three periods and whether the costs the firms faced were low or not. Recall that costs are endogenous since they are determined based on sellers' success in (a) reaching the total contribution threshold and (b) obtaining a positive random draw leading to a successful innovation to reduce costs. We therefore use standard instrumental variables techniques, using the exogenous "luck" random draw for innovation success as the identification variable for low costs. The estimates indicate that in periods when the sellers face lower costs the deviation of price from the competitive equilibrium is higher.
Buyers are not aware of any seller cost reductions, so this indicates that sellers succeed in maintaining higher prices and reaping a greater share of the benefits of cost reduction.
Controlling for these cost reductions and the overall time trend, seller communication opportunities do not have a significant impact on prices. Communication however increases the probability of meeting the contribution threshold (as shown in Section 3.1 and Table 4 ), leading to a higher probability that the sellers have lower costs. Hence communication opportunities do have an effect on market outcomes.
Additional information regarding the relationship between communication and collusion can be obtained directly from an examination of sellers' chat communication. We do not attempt a detailed content analysis of their chats, but we have examined the communications data and found, surprisingly, that sellers often do not discuss price fixing. This is particularly the case for the Combined treatment. This stands in contrast to the frequent observation in previous price conspiracy experiments (dating back to Isaac and Plott, 1981) , where subjects usually immediately recognize conspiratorial opportunities and try to implement collusive agreements.
This could be due, in part, to our design choice to not inform the subjects who are chatting that they are the only sellers in their market. They need to communicate their seller role through discussions with others in the chat room.
Rather than trying to fix prices, in the Combined treatment subjects often focus instead on solving the coordination problem of funding the cost-reducing public good. They are generally cooperative and often agree on contributing 500 each to the fund. They also do not seem to be discouraged by a negative random outcome when trying to provide the public good.
In the Market Only treatment, where they do not have the opportunity to contribute to the research fund, subjects discuss prices and earnings more often. For example, in Session 25, the subjects are very conspiratorial from the start of the communication stage and recognise that they are the only sellers in the market. They discuss fixing prices to a specific level and encourage each other to delay accepting offers from buyers. 8 Even in these cases, however, prices are not often above the competitive equilibrium. This could be due to the competitive properties of the double auction institution, where there is ample evidence that collusions are hard to maintain (Isaac et al., 1984; Clauser and Plott, 1993) . We identified 4 sessions out of the 8 sessions in the Market treatment where subjects discuss prices explicitly and attempt to fix it at a level higher than what they think is the equilibrium price in the market. The deviation of price from the equilibrium prediction in these 4 sessions are higher than in the 4 sessions where subjects do not discuss price fixing (2.40 versus -6.89). These differences are not statistically significant, however, based on a Wilcoxon ranksum test (p-value= 0.563).
Market Competition-Efficiency
A key market performance measure that is directly observable in economics experiments is efficiency-how well do market transactions exploit the available gains from exchange? We employ the standard measure of efficiency, which is the ratio of actual (observed) gains from trade to the maximum possible gains given the underlying cost and value conditions of the traders in the experimental session, expressed as a percentage. Note that these maximum gains from trade are greater in the period blocks where sellers have succeeded in lowering their costs. Figure 4 presents the time series of efficiency across the treatments and shows that efficiency is lower in the Combined treatments as compared to the Market Only treatments.
To determine whether trading efficiency is statistically different across treatments we first conduct Wilcoxon rank-sum tests which use one session as the unit of observation. This reveals that the efficiency measure is statistically different for the no communication condition:
in the Market Only treatment efficiency levels were significantly higher than the Combined sessions (78% versus 70%, p-value: 0.008). The efficiency levels were not statistically different in the communication condition and also within the Combined and the Market Only treatments with and without communication. We also present a random effects regression for trading efficiency in column (2) of Table 5 . The independent variables are the same as the ones used in the regression for price deviations: time, whether firms communicated at the beginning of the block of three periods, treatment dummies and whether the costs the firms faced were low or not.
We again instrumented for cost level using the same random innovation success for identification. The results also show that trading efficiency is lower in the Combined treatment, and the opportunity to communicate does not impact efficiency.
R&D spillovers in the Market
Although trading efficiency declines in the Combined treatment when sellers can collaborate to reduce their costs, this is not because total realized trading surplus declines.
Efficiency falls in this treatment relative to the Market Only treatment because the cost reductions lead to a greater maximum trading surplus. That is, a higher target surplus is used in the denominator of the efficiency measure in the low-cost periods. Figure 5 shows that total gains from exchange are usually higher in the Combined treatment than the Market Only treatment. (These figures do not subtract the R&D investments that are incurred to reduce costs.)
The question we address in this subsection is how this increased surplus is divided between the sellers and the buyers in the market.
Both buyers and sellers earn higher profits in the period blocks in which costs are low.
Estimates from random effects regressions (Table 4 ) using buyer profits and seller profits as dependent variables, show that while both buyers and sellers make significantly higher profits in the periods in which costs are low, sellers' total profit increase from lower costs is much higher than buyers' total profit increase. This indicates that the R&D spillovers that accrue to buyers are relatively small, and buyers' indirect benefit from the lower costs is much smaller than the sellers' direct benefit. Overall the buyers earn a total of 4011 on average in period blocks when the costs were low and a total of 2910 when costs were high in the Combined treatment. The difference of 1101 can be thought of as the impact of the R&D spillover. This total spillover falls below the equilibrium level of the spillover, which is 2475. This shortfall reflects the less than 100 percent efficiency realized by the market, and the super-competitive prices in some sessions.
Discussion of Results
We find that though individuals cooperate when given an opportunity, they cooperate somewhat less frequently in environments where they also compete in a market. These behavioural spillovers could be attributed to the mechanism through which subjects realize the benefits of cooperation. The benefits to sellers depend crucially on factors that are outside their direct control. Even though we chose a double auction trading institution that is known to lead to high efficiency and competitive prices even with small numbers of traders, the realized trading surplus limited the benefits of cooperation. The realized profits of sellers in period blocks when they face lower costs reflect this problem. In the Combined treatment each seller on an average made a profit of 2126 in a period block when costs were low and 1157 when costs were high, and hence this difference of 969 is less than the return of 1500 that we imposed exogenously in the Public Good Only sessions. 9 Although this spillover from competition to cooperation is observed, it is only weakly significant. This weak effect is surprising given the strongly competitive properties of the double auction.
In both the Public Good Only and the Combined treatments, allowing participants to communicate substantially improves their ability to coordinate in funding a public good.
Communication seems to have a greater impact on outcomes in the Combined treatment, with both indicators of cooperative behaviour showing marked improvements in this treatment. For example, the frequency at which the threshold was met was three times higher in the Combined treatment than in the Public Good Only treatment when communication was allowed. This suggests that though communication is important in both the treatments, it has a critical role to play in the market environment, where competitive forces can further dilute cooperation.
efficiency, hence there is very little behavioural spillover from cooperation to weaken competition. Communication however does impact the market because it leads to lower costs more frequently. Price deviations are higher when costs are lowered for sellers in the market due to the provision of the public good. Nevertheless, giving sellers the option to cooperate increases the earnings of both sellers and buyers. R&D spillovers are therefore observed in our experiment, hence allowing one side of the market to cooperate can lead to positive externalities.
Our results in general suggest that competitive forces and preferences for cooperation can potentially co-exist. This could imply, for example, that organisations or industries that provide incentives to encourage both cooperation and competition amongst their employees could benefit from both, without running the risk of one potentially eroding the other. In the context of problems such as climate change, policy makers could promote R&D collaborations and still expect robust market competition. Random effects tobit regression. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. The numbers in the parentheses are the standard errors. Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 a: Lowcost is instrumented and the estimates are from an IV regression. 
